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INTRODUCTION
The recent death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016, leaves
the U.S. Supreme Court in ideological equipoise.1 The Court is seemingly at
a 4–4 impasse on many charged cases until Justice Scalia is replaced.2
However, the immediate effect of Justice Scalia’s absence is not as simple in
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1 Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel
Alito form the conservative bloc on the Court—to which Justice Scalia also belonged. Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan form the liberal bloc. See Dan
Roberts & Sabrina Siddiqui, Anthony Kennedy: How One Man’s Evolution Legalized Marriage for
Millions, GUARDIAN (June 26, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/26/kennedyruling-gay-marriage-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/9BF7-GL66] (discussing how Justice Kennedy
often serves as the Court’s swing vote). Of the conservative Justices, Justice Kennedy has been the
most likely to crossover and side with the liberal bloc. Id.
2 On March 16, 2016, President Barack Obama nominated Chief Judge Merrick Garland of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to replace Justice Scalia.
Michael D. Shear, Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Gardiner Harris, Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obamasupreme-court-nominee.html [https://perma.cc/H8YN-5D23]. However, a number of Republican
senators—including Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell—have stated repeatedly that the
Senate will not act on President Obama’s nomination and Justice Scalia’s seat will remain vacant
until the next President is inaugurated in 2017. Id.
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all cases. For example, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II)3—the
pending case about race-conscious university admissions at the University of
Texas at Austin (UT)—one might think that Justice Scalia’s absence would
yield a ruling more favorable to proponents of affirmative action. But Fisher
II could actually turn out worse for affirmative action proponents than it
would have with Justice Scalia on the Court. And ironically, this may happen
if Justice Anthony Kennedy votes with the liberal Justices to uphold UT’s
race-conscious policy.
The reasons for this irony are threefold. First, Justice Elena Kagan
recused herself from Fisher, due to her role in earlier phases of the case when
she was Solicitor General under the Obama Administration.4 With Justice
Scalia’s death, seven Justices will decide Fisher II—eliminating, rather than
creating, the possibility of a tie. Because Justice Kennedy is still the Court’s
swing vote, his view will probably be outcome-determinative in Fisher II.
Justice Kennedy is likely to write a controlling opinion, as has often been the
case in the past decade5—but this time by a 4–3 vote. Assuming a ruling on
the merits, his Fisher II opinion will become Supreme Court precedent and
apply to the entire nation.
Second, with Justice Kagan recused, the effect of Justice Scalia’s absence
on Fisher II actually depends on Justice Kennedy’s vote. If Justice Kennedy
votes to strike down UT’s race-conscious admissions policy, then Justice
Scalia’s absence does not matter as much. Under that scenario, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion would control Fisher II either with Scalia (by a 5–3
majority) or without him (by a 4–3 majority). Either of these would reverse
the Fifth Circuit and set precedent.
But if Justice Kennedy votes to uphold UT’s policy, Justice Scalia’s absence
comes into play. With Justice Scalia still on the Court, an affirmance by
Kennedy would have led to a 4–4 tie in Fisher II, thereby passively upholding
the decision of the Fifth Circuit without setting any precedent. Since Justice
Scalia is gone, however, a Justice Kennedy affirmance would now control
Fisher II and set precedent.

3 See 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015) (mem.) (granting certiorari). This followed the Court’s prior ruling
in Fisher I. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (remanding the case
back to the Fifth Circuit to apply the correct standard of strict scrutiny). This Essay will refer to
the case simply as “Fisher” when referencing the entire Fisher litigation.
4 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Justices’ Comments Don’t Bode Well for Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/politics/supreme-court-to-revisitcase-that-may-alter-affirmative-action.html [https://perma.cc/X66K-FTSB].
5 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (5–4 decision) (Kennedy, J., for the
Court) (holding that states may not deny to same sex couples the fundamental right to marry).
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Third, Fisher II itself is unusual for an affirmative action case.6 The main
issue is not the implementation of UT’s race-conscious policy, but whether
UT needs that policy at all. Petitioner Abigail Noel Fisher contends that UT
attains its compelling interest in diversity with Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law
(TTPL)7 alone.8 The TTPL, which grants automatic admission to UT for
top Texas public high school students, accounts for three-quarters of UT’s
admitted class9 on a race-neutral basis.10 UT’s use of race applies only to the
remainder. Both parties in Fisher conceded that UT’s race-conscious policy is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s Grutter v. Bollinger11 precedent.12 The
6 For the history of Fisher up until the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fisher I, see Vinay Harpalani,
Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 463, 498-504 (2012). For commentary on the Fisher I decision, see generally Vinay
Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling: Defending Race-Conscious Admissions After Fisher,
45 SETON HALL L. REV 761 (2015) [hereinafter Harpalani, Broadly Compelling]. For commentary on
the prospects of Fisher II, see Vinay Harpalani, Fisher v. Texas, The Remix, ISCOTUSNOW BLOG
(July 18, 2015), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/iscotus/fisher-v-texas-the-remix [https://perma.cc/V879CL8C]. For a reaction to the Fisher II oral argument, see Vinay Harpalani, The Fishing Expedition
Continues: Will There Be a Fisher III?, ISCOTUSNOW BLOG (Dec. 14, 2015), http://
blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/iscotus/will-there-be-a-fisher-iii [https://perma.cc/JT8M-NYN8] [hereinafter
Harpalani, Fishing Expedition Continues]. Finally, for court documents related to the Fisher litigation,
see FISHER VS. TEX., UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Fisher-VTexas.html [https://perma.cc/S8S7-HR6B] (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
7 See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 1997). Originally, the TTPL guaranteed
admission to UT to the top 10% of each graduating class in all Texas public high schools. Id. The law
has since been amended to cap the number of students admitted to UT under the TTPL. Currently,
UT need only admit 75% of its class through the TTPL, which does not guarantee a slot to every
student in the top 10% of their high school class. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a-1) (West 2015).
8 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 31-37, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (asserting
that UT could not demonstrate the necessity of its affirmative action plan because of the TTPL);
see also Brief for Petitioner at 2, Fisher II, No. 14-981 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2015) (arguing that UT’s
affirmative action plan is “highly dubious” because of the TTPL).
9 See EDUC. § 51.803(a-1).
10 The Fisher litigation has assumed that the TTPL is “race neutral”—meaning there is no
direct and explicit consideration of race in the decisionmaking process. Nevertheless, this is a
debatable assumption. Harpalani, Broadly Compelling, supra note 6, at 764 n.3.
11 See 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s use of race as
a flexible admissions factor in a holistic, individualized review of applicants); see also Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down the University of Michigan’s use of race as a rigid,
mechanical admissions factor without individualized review in its undergraduate admissions). The
Grutter–Gratz framework defines the scope of constitutionally permissible and impermissible uses
of race in university admissions.
12 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 234 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that Petitioner
“do[es] not allege that UT’s race-conscious admissions policy is functionally different from . . . the
policy upheld in Grutter . . . . [but rather] question[s] whether UT needs a Grutter-like policy.”), rev’d,
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). At the Fisher II oral argument, Petitioner did raise a new argument,
subtly distinguishing between UT’s policy and the one upheld in Grutter. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 4-8, 16-17, Fisher II, No. 14-981 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2015) (arguing that UT’s policy is “not
truly holistic” because race is not considered at the exact same time as applicant’s academic
qualifications and the entirety of the applicant’s profile). However, this is a rather minor distinction,
and for most of the Fisher litigation, Petitioner has conceded that UT’s policy is functionally similar
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parties also conceded that UT’s policy is actually more modest in scope than
the University of Michigan Law School policy upheld in Grutter.13
Consequently, Justice Kennedy could actually vote to affirm UT’s modest
policy and still narrow the scope of Grutter, curbing affirmative action in
university admissions in the process. With these considerations in mind, this
Essay turns to examine the possible outcomes in Fisher II and their impact on
affirmative action more broadly.
I. A VOTE AGAINST UT
Justice Kennedy may well vote to strike down UT’s race-conscious
admissions policy. He could accept Petitioner’s main argument and find that
UT has not demonstrated that it needs to use this policy, in addition to the
TTPL, to attain the educational benefits of diversity. This would be a loss for
affirmative action, but Justice Scalia’s absence does not affect it.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy is unlikely to vote to overturn Grutter
altogether. Although he dissented in Grutter, Justice Kennedy has recognized
a compelling interest in diversity in three separate Supreme Court opinions.14
In fact, for proponents of affirmative action, the silver lining here could be a
narrowly framed ruling: one that focuses on the effects of the TTPL and thus
has little applicability beyond UT.
II. A VOTE FOR UT
Alternatively, Justice Kennedy could vote to uphold UT’s race-conscious
admissions policy, based on its modesty. In his Grutter dissent, Justice
Kennedy stated: “There is no constitutional objection to the goal of
considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve
diversity,” so long as universities make sure “that each applicant receives
individual consideration and that race does not become a predominant factor
in the admissions decisionmaking.”15 Even though he found that the
to the one upheld in Grutter. For a longer discussion of these points, see Harpalani, Fishing Expedition
Continues, supra note 6.
13 See infra notes 16–17, 23–24 and accompanying text (noting Petitioner’s argument that UT’s
race-conscious policy has only minimal effects).
14 See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (“The attainment of a diverse student body . . . serves values
beyond race alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and
stereotypes.”); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797-98 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“[A] district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a
diverse student population. Race may be one component of that diversity . . . .”); Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“To be constitutional, a university’s compelling interest in a
diverse student body must be achieved by a system where individual assessment is safeguarded
through the entire process.”).
15 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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University of Michigan Law School plan did not fulfill this requirement,
Justice Kennedy could hold that UT’s policy does satisfy it.
Paradoxically, one of Petitioner’s arguments could tilt Justice Kennedy in
that direction. Petitioner has argued that UT’s use of race is too modest to
yield any diversity benefits and that UT cannot demonstrate that race was a
deciding factor in the admission of any students.16 Consequently, Petitioner
has contended that UT’s race-conscious policy did not further any compelling
interest.17 But at the Fisher I oral argument, Justice Kennedy was at least
initially antithetical to Petitioner’s contention.18 And UT effectively
countered Petitioner, arguing that the modesty of its race-conscious policy
was a “constitutional virtue, not a vice,”19 because it demonstrated UT’s
commitment to phasing out the use of race and finding race-neutral alternatives.20
If Justice Kennedy votes to uphold UT’s race-conscious policy based on
its modesty, his opinion would control Fisher II 4–3 and set precedent. This
would not have been the case if Justice Scalia were still a member of the
Court, as such an affirmance by Kennedy would then have resulted in a 4–4
tie. But ironically, because UT’s race-conscious admissions policy is more
modest than the plan upheld in Grutter, Justice Kennedy could actually
approve UT’s plan and still limit the scope of Grutter—dealing a blow to
proponents of affirmative action.
In fact, Kennedy could craft a Fisher II affirmance that focuses directly on
the modesty of UT’s plan—building on his Grutter dissent21—thereby making
such modesty a defining principle of a constitutional, race-conscious
university admissions policy. As Professors Ian Ayres and Sidney Foster note,
Grutter itself is agnostic on the weight of race in the admissions process.22
16 See Brief for Petitioner, Fisher I, supra note 8, at 38-39 (“UT is unable to identify any students
who were ultimately offered admission due to their race who would not have otherwise been offered
admission.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17 See id. at 38-42 (arguing that racial classifications are unnecessary).
18 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (asking
Petitioner’s counsel: “You argue that the University’s race-conscious admission plan is not necessary
to achieve a diverse student body because it admits so few people—so few minorities. And I had
trouble with that . . . . [I]f it’s so few, then what’s the problem?”).
19 Brief for Respondents at 36, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
20 Id. For other critiques of Petitioner’s argument, see Harpalani, Broadly Compelling, supra note
6, at 796-99 (noting that if universities phase out the use of race in admissions gradually, it logically
follows that at some point the use of race will be small but still constitutional; that a small number
of students can still provide the educational benefits of diversity; and that it is difficult to “smoke
out” modest uses of race). But see Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring
After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 523 n.27 (2007) (“At least as a theoretical matter,
narrow tailoring requires not only that preferences not be too large, but also that they not be too
small so as to fail to achieve the goals of the relevant compelling government interest.”).
21 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22 See Ayres & Foster, supra note 20, at 526 (noting that the Grutter Court did not “engage in
an inquiry into how much weight each school placed on race”).
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Professors Ayres and Foster argue that the University of Michigan Law
School’s race-conscious policy was outcome determinative for many
applicants.23 This stands in contrast to UT’s policy, which Petitioner has
contended did not make a difference for any minority applicants.24 Professors
Ayres and Foster further suggest that courts should impose a limit on the
weight of race in university admissions.25 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s opinion could
both affirm UT’s policy and create such a limiting principle on race-conscious
admissions policies.
Although such a ruling in Fisher II would technically be a victory for UT,
it would further limit universities’ use of race in admissions. This would be a
worse outcome for affirmative action proponents than if Justice Scalia had
been on the Court and Justice Kennedy’s opinion had no precedential value.
Quite ironically, in Justice Scalia’s absence, affirmative action may suffer even
if Justice Kennedy affirms UT’s policy. There is little prospect for an
affirmative action victory in Fisher II if the Court reaches the merits.
III. A PUNT
The best result for affirmative action would be another punt: a remand all
the way back to the district court for more fact-finding. Justice Kennedy,
along with Justice Samuel Alito, did discuss this prospect at the Fisher II oral
argument. Both of them wondered if additional facts could settle the issue of
whether UT really needs its race-conscious policy to attain the educational
benefits of diversity.26 This result would delay matters further for UT, but it
is probably the only way for Justice Kennedy to write a controlling opinion
that does not narrow Grutter.
CONCLUSION
If the Supreme Court rules on the merits of Fisher II, supporters of
race-conscious university admissions should brace for disappointment, even
if UT’s policy is affirmed. Indeed, affirmance may actually be worse in the
long run for supporters than a decision striking down the policy. Affirmative

23 See id. at 529-33 (noting that the University of Michigan Law School admissions plan upheld
in Grutter had a greater percentage of applicants for whom race determined admissions outcome
than the undergraduate plan struck down in Gratz).
24 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25 See Ayres & Foster, supra note 20, at 582-83 (advocating a return to the “minimum necessary
preference requirement”).
26 Transcript of Oral Argument, Fisher II, supra note 12, at 18-23.
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action jurisprudence today is an Orwellian double-edged sword,27 and as the
late Professor Derrick Bell predicted after Grutter, “civil rights victory” here
will be “hard to distinguish from defeat.”28

Preferred Citation: Vinay Harpalani, Victory Is Defeat: The Ironic
Consequence of Justice Scalia’s Death for Fisher v. University of Texas, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 155 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-UPa-L-Rev-Online-155.pdf.

27 Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 4 (1950) (giving ironic political slogans: “War is Peace,”
“Freedom is Slavery,” and “Ignorance is Strength”). The title of this Essay, “Victory is Defeat,” is
based on these slogans.
28 Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003).

